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Steadman: Lindland v. United States of America Wrestling Association: The R

LINDLAND V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WRESTLING ASSOCIA TION: THE ROLE OF
ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
THE MAKING OF AN OLYMPIC SUCCESS*

I. INTRODUCTION
Matt Lindland of the United States won a silver medal in GrecoRoman wrestling at the 2000 Olympic Games ("Games") in
Sydney, Australia. This achievement was the result of a lifetime
of dedication and training, but it would not have been possible
without the utilization of federal law and intervention by the
The well-publicized conflict
United States Judiciary.
demonstrated the ability of federal law, arbitration, and the
judiciary to affect the selection of American Olympians and the
athletic competitions used to nominate them. This controversy
was especially captivating given the urgency of the proceedings
last summer with the 2000 Games fast approaching. Ultimately,
Matt Lindland's Olympic achievement was the result of victories
both on the mat and in the courtroom.
In this analysis, I will first introduce the athletes and
organizations at the center of the controversy. I will then describe
the progression of this legal battle that began immediately
following the Olympic Trials in Dallas. The disputed competition
in question was followed by arbitration hearings in both Chicago
and Denver, and then was adjudicated several times in the United
States District and Appellate Courts. Lindland's appointment to
the United States Olympic Team was not secured until a short time
before the Opening Ceremonies in Sydney.

* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. James Loomstein for
his many helpful comments and suggestions during the preparation of this note.
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I. THE PARTIES

A. The Athletes
At the center of this conflict were two internationally ranked
American wrestlers. Thirty year old Matt Lindland is a four-time
national champion and current U.S. champion in the 167.5-pound
weight class.' He is a former University of Nebraska wrestler,
where he is now an assistant coach.2 Lindland entered the
Olympic Trials ("Trials") as the overwhelming favorite and the top
seed. 3 Keith Sieracki is a twenty-nine year old Army sergeant
stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado. 4 He is originally from
Richland Center, Wisconsin and is a member of the U.S. Army's
World-Class Athlete Program.5 This program facilitates and
encourages those Army personnel with superior athletic talents to
compete at the international level. 6 He entered the Olympic Trials
as the second seed.7

I Abby Haight, "Lindland Loses In Final, Plans To Appeal", THE
OREGONIAN,

June 25, 2000.

2 Mark R. Madler, "ArbitratorOrders Olympic Wrestlers Back To The Mat",
The Recorder, Aug. 11, 2000, Craig Sesker, "Court Rules For Lindland",
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,

Aug. 25,2000.

3 Abby Haight, "LindlandLoses In Final,Plans To Appeal", The Oregonian,
June 25, 2000, NBC Sports Olympic Website, Lindland Biography (visited Oct.
22, 2000) <http://wvw.nbcolympics.com/?/bios/wr/lindmat/lindlmatbio_01.
html>.
4 Paula Parrish, "Supreme Court Stays Out of Fight/Lindland Wins Final
Legal Battle For Olympic Berth", THE GAZETTE, Sept. 7, 2000.
5 The GoArmy Website, <http://wwv.goarmy.com/events/armyolym
/wrestling.htm> (visited Oct. 16, 2000).
6 Id.
7 See supra note 1.
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B. UnitedStates ofAmerica Wrestling Inc.

USA Wrestling ("USAW") is the National Governing Body
("NGB") for amateur wrestling in the United States. 8 As a NGB,
it is the sport's representative to the United States Olympic
Committee and the International Wrestling Federation. 9 The
USAW conducts both grassroots and elite wrestling programs
across the country.' 0 The USAW is directly responsible for the
selection and training of teams to represent the United States in
international competitions such as the Olympic Games."

C. United States Olympic Committee
The United States Olympic Committee ("USOC") is a
corporation first established by federal law in 1950.12 "The USOC
is the "coordinating body" for amateur athletic activity in the
United States and is the ultimate authority with respect to U.S.
representation in the Olympic Games."' 13 The purposes of the
USOC are described in the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur
Sports Act. 14 They include the exercising of exclusive jurisdiction
over "all matters pertaining to the United States participation in the
Olympic Games."' 15 Furthermore, the Act provides that the USOC
is to afford "swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving
amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports
organizations."' 16 The USOC can appoint an amateur sports

8 The USA Wrestling Website, http://usawrestling.org/whatis.htm (visited
Oct. 16, 2000).

9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Foschi v. U.S. Swimming, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 232, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
13 Id.
14 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (Supp. 2000).
15 36 U.S.C. § 220503(3)(A) (Supp. 2000).
16 36 U.S.C. § 220503(8) (Supp. 2000).
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organization as the NGB for
17 any sport included in the Olympics or
the Pan-American Games.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Olympic Trials
The controversy began at the Trials on June 24, 2000, in Dallas,
Texas. 18 Only the champion in each weight class at the Trials
competition was to represent the United States at the Olympic
Games.
As the reigning national champion, Lindland was
automatically placed in the final for the 167.5 weight class at the
Trials competition. 19 Sieracki prevailed over the rest of the field in
a single-elimination tournament. 20 The two wrestlers squared off
in the best of three finals, with the victor to earn a trip to the
Sydney Games. 2' Sieracki prevailed in the first match by a score
of 7-3, and Lindland fought back with a 4-0 victory in the second
bout.22 The third and deciding match was competed ferociously,
with Lindland bleeding from above his left-eye at one point and
Sieracki claiming he was bitten on the ear. 23 The match went into

17 36 U.S.C. §220521(a) (Supp. 2000). "For any sport which is included on
the program of the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, or the PanAmerican Games, the corporation is authorized to recognize as a national
governing body... an amateur sports organization which files an application and
is eligible for such recognition." Id. "The corporation may recognize only one
national governing body for each sport for which an application is made and
approved." Id.
18 See supra note 1.
19 NBC Olympic Website, http://www.nbcolympics.com/?Ibios/wr/
lindmat/lindlmatbio__01.htmlWrestling//AthleteBios//lof2//MattLindland
(visited Nov. 1, 2000).
20 Id.
21 Abby Haight, "Lindland Loses In Final, Plans To Appeal", THE
OREGONIAN, June 25, 2000.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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137

overtime, and
eventually Sieracki was ruled the victor by a 2-1
24
final score.

B. InternalAppeals
Lindland immediately protested the result of the deciding
match. 25 He claimed that Sieracki's winning point was awarded as
26
the result of a leg maneuver illegal in Greco-Roman Wrestling.
In a sport where officiating complaints are relatively common, 27a
protest committee is provided on-site for immediate appeals.
After the on-site committee denied Lindland's protest 28 he was
granted a hearing on July 13 th in front of the USAW's GrecoRoman Sport Committee. 29 After a hearing conducted through a
conference call and with five of its nine members participating, the
Committee upheld Sieracki's victory. 30 The Committee relied
primarily on the testimony of eyewitnesses to the match in
upholding the original result.3 ' It was the procedure
of this
32
hearing on which Lindland based his further appeals.

24 Id.
25 Craig Sesker, "Court Rules For Lindland", OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Aug. 25, 2000.
26 Mark R. Madler, "Arbitrator Orders Olympic Wrestlers Back To The
Mat", The Recorder, Aug. 11, 2000. In Greco Roman Wrestling, no holds are
allowed below the legs and the legs themselves can only be used for support and
balance. Bob Ryan, "Being Matt Lindland: He's Silver-Screen Star", THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17, 2000.
27 Id.
28 See supra note 25.
29 Mark R. Madler, "Arbitrator Orders Olympic Wrestlers Back To The
Mat", THE RECORDER, Aug. 11, 2000.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Lindland v. United States of America Wrestling Association, Inc., No. 003220, 00-3236 2000 WL 1269687, at *2 (7th Cir. Sept. 5, 2000).
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C. The Ted Stevens Olympic andAmateur Sports Act
Along with outlining the powers and duties of the USOC, The
Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act ("Stevens Act")
delineates the relationship between the USOC, NGB's, and the
athletes they govern. The Stevens Act gives athletes the right to
submit to arbitration a determination made by a NGB such as the
USAW.3 3 Before arbitration can be sought, an individual must
have exhausted all possible remedies that are provided by the
NGB. 34 Once the Greco-Roman Sports Committee denied
Lindland's appeal, he had exhausted his possible remedies with the
USAW and was eligible to request outside arbitration. The
Stevens Act allows submission of a conflict to any regional office
of the American Arbitration Society. 35 Lindland and the USAW
hearing was held in
agreed to arbitration over the dispute, and the
36
Bums.
Daniel
Chicago in front of Arbitrator
D. The Burns ArbitrationAward
On August 9, 2000, Lindland and the USAW participated in the
arbitration hearing.37 Bums ruled that Lindland's due process
rights were violated because the Greco-Roman Sport Committee
refused to examine videotape of the match, and because only five
38
of the nine Committee members were present at the hearing.
Bums ordered a rematch of the third and final Olympic Trials'
33 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a),(b) (Supp. 2000). "A party aggrieved by a
determination of the corporation under section 220527 or 220528 of this title
may obtain review by any regional office of the American Arbitration
Association. A demand for arbitration must be submitted within 30 days after
the determination of the corporation." Id.
34 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a) (Supp. 2000); 36 U.S.C. § 220527(b)(1) (Supp.
2000); Barnes v. International Amateur Athletic Federation, 862 F. Supp. 1537

(S.D.W.V. 1993).
35 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a), (b)(Supp. 2000).
36 Mark R. Madler, "Arbitrator Orders Olympic Wrestlers Back To The
Mat", THE RECORDER, Aug. 11,

2000.

37 Id.
38 Id.
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bout. 39

The arbitrator stated in his decision that "the committee
hearing.. .unfairly and unreasonably failed to provide a Rrocedure
for the equitable resolution of Lindland's grievance." 0 Bums
further concluded that the hearing process significantly failed to
afford Lindland "the prompt and equitable process called for in the
Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports42 Act.' 1 Bums set the
rematch for five days later on August 14t.
A.Burns' determination that Lindland's protest was not given
the benefits of due process was nearly as subjective as the referee's
decision to award Sieracki the second and winning point. The
arbitrator had to examine the specific circumstances surrounding
Lindland's internal appeals, and decide whether they satisfied the
general requirements of the Act.4 3 The Act does not enumerate
any specific guidelines for the execution of such protest
procedures, and Bums had to use his subjective judgment in
determining whether they were conducted in fairness to all parties.
His decision to order a rematch could only represent his best
opinion on the circumstances as a whole, and it is nearly
impossible for any commentator to objectively determine whether
it was correct or erroneous.

E. The Rematch
The rematch of the Olympic Trials' final bout was held at the
Olympic Training Center in Colorado Springs. 44 Sieracki, who
returned from Russia only six days prior, appeared exhausted and
unprepared. a Lindland, who quickly shed fourteen pounds to
make weight for the bout, was dominating in defeating Sieracki by
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Mark R. Madler, "Arbitrator Orders Olympic Wrestlers Back To The
Mat", THE RECORDER, Aug. 11, 2000.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Paula Parrish, "Another Twist In Wrestling Flap", THE GAZETTE, Aug. 31,

2000.
45 Id.
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a score of 8_0.46 Following the match, the USAW refused to
recognize the outcome as dispositive and proceeded to 'nominate
Sieracki to the USOC as the representative to the Olympic Team at
the 167.5-pound weight class.47 This action was in disregard of
the Bums Award, which ruled that the championship series stood
tied at one, with the deciding third bout to be re-wrestled.48 By
refusing to nominate Lindland as the sole wrestler to represent the
United States at the 167.5-pound weight class, the USAW did not
recognize the Colorado Springs bout as a true re-match of the
Trials' contest.

F.

The CampbellAward and JudicialConfirmation
of The Burns Award

August 24, 2000 brought another dramatic turn of events.
Following his defeat in Colorado Springs, Sieracki sought
arbitration of his own seeking confirmation of his original victory
in the Trials match in Dallas. 49 In Denver on the 2 4 th, Arbitrator
A. Bruce Campbell ruled in favor of Sieracki and instructed the
USAW that he should remain the nominee to the Olympic Team.50
In his decision, Campbell stated that there were no errors in the
officiating of the match or in the appeals process that warranted a
rematch of the Trials' bout. 51 This decision covered the same
ground as the previous arbitration, but- disagreed with Bums'

46 Id.
47 Lindland v. United States of America Wrestling Association, Inc., No. 003177, 2000 WL 1209451, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 24,2000).
48 Amateur Wrestling with Mako Furukawa website, http://amateurwrestle
.about.com/sports/amateurwrestle/librarylblmedia081000.htm (visited Nov. 12,
2000).
49 Paula Parrish, "Another Twist In WrestlingFlap", THE GAZETTE, Aug. 3 1,

2000.
50 Craig Sesker, "Court Rules For Lindland", OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Aug. 25, 2000.

51 Text Of The FindingAnd Conclusions,As Well As The Award, Concerning
Case 30 190 00483 00, http://www.themat.com/pressbox/pressdetail.asp?aid
=158 (visited Oct. 22, 2000).
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internal protest procedures failed to grant Lindland
finding that the
52
due process.
On August 2 3 rd , the day that the Denver arbitration hearing
began, Lindland sought judicial enforcement of the Burns award in
53
the United States District Court, Northern Division in Chicago.
Lindland's cause of action was provided in the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA").54 The FAA enumerates a private right of action for
individuals seeking to enforce arbitration decisions, and requires
the judicial enforcement of all valid awards.5 5 Nevertheless, the
District Court denied Lindland's request, and he immediately
States Appellate Court of the Seventh
appealed to the United
56
Chicago.
Circuit in

1. Mootness andJurisdiction
The Appellate Court first discussed Lindland's standing in
seeking to enforce the Bums Award. In denying adjudication of
his claim, the District Court ruled it was "dismissed as moot"
because the Bums award was limited in its relief.5 7 The District
Court reasoned that the award's purpose was to grant Lindland a
rematch but the outcome of that bout was not intended to compel
the USAW into nominating the winner to the USOC.58 The
Appeals Court disagreed, stating that the claim could not be moot
USA Wrestling to designate
so long as it was still possible for 59
team.
the
for
nominee
its
Lindland as

52 Lindland, 2000 WL 1269687, at *2.
53 Craig Sesker, "Court Rules For Lindland",

OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,

Aug. 25, 2000.
54 See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994); (stating "...at any time within one year after the
award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified
for an order confirming the award.")
55 Lindland, 2000 WL 1209451, at *1.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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The District Court also found that it had no jurisdiction over
Lindland's claim. 60 The Seventh Circuit again disagreed, finding
that the jurisdiction requirement was satisfied due to the diversity
of citizenship between the parties and because a position on the
U.S. Olympic team could not be said, as a legal certainty, to be
worth less than the required $75,000.61

2. Language
The Appellate Court decided that the Bums Award coupled with
Lindland's victory in the rematch entitled him to the nomination to
the Olympic Team. 62 In determining that Lindland's victory in
Colorado Springs compelled the USAW to nominate him to the
USOC, the Seventh Circuit looked to the language of the
arbitration award. The Bums award ordered "Bout #244 of the
June 24, 2000 Olympic Trials will be re-wrestled in accord with
63
the USA Wrestling rules and officiating in effect at the time."
The Court stated that the purpose of the Burns Award was to
completely restage Trials Bout #244, which according to the
USAW's own rules entitles the winner to be sent to Sydney as a
member of the American team. 64 If the result in Colorado Springs
could not compel the USAW to action, the Bums Award had the
effect of staging an exhibition match. The Court pointedly states
that the USAW's own rules do not say the winner of the
championship bout will be nominated if "it is in the mood to do
so," but that the winner's name will automatically be sent.65 The
Court found that the Bums Award made the rematch determinative

60 Lindland, 2000 WL 1209451, at *1.
61 Id. (stating that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $
75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-- (1) Citizens of different
States.") 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332 (Supp. 2000).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at *2.
65 Lindland,2000 WL 1209451, at *2.
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and its outcome the complete substitution of the result of the third
bout in Dallas.

3. USA W's claims
The USAW maintained that the Bums Award was flawed
because Sieracki was not a party to the arbitration hearing. 66 in
rejecting this claim, the Court looked to the language of the
Stevens Act. Section 220529 calls for arbitration between the
aggrieved athlete and the NGB, and does not require arbitration
Furthermore, the Court
between the athletes themselves. 67
explained that Lindland named the correct party in his arbitration
complaint, as it was only the USAW that could redress his
grievance with nomination to the Olympic Team. 68 The decision
went on to explain that arbitration hearings never have required the
participation of all parties who could be potentially affected by an
award, and such an 69arrangement "would work a revolution in
arbitral proceedings."

G. Writ of Mandamus and Further CourtAction
Following the Seventh Circuit's decision to enforce the Burns
Award and order the nomination of Matt Lindland to the USOC,
the USAW promptly did the opposite and informed the USOC of
its nomination of Keith Sieracki.7 ° On August 2 5 th, the following
day, Lindland was again in the Seventh Circuit courtroom
petitioning for a writ of mandamus to force the USAW to comply
made the previous day and nominate Lindland to
with the decision
71
the USOC.
66 Id.
67 Id., see also 36 U.S.C. § 220529 (Supp. 2000).
68 Lindland, 2000 WL 1209451, at *2.

69 Id.
70 Lindland v. United States of America Wrestling Association, Inc., No. 003177, 2000 WL 1257260, at *1(7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2000) (per curiam).

71 Id.
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In a brief and terse opinion the Court granted Lindland's request
for the writ, and threatened a penalty of contempt on the USAW if
they continued to ignore judicial mandates. 72 The opinion
concluded by distinguishing the conflicting Bums and Campbell
awards, stating that the "Judicial Branch of the United States of
America has instructed it to implement the Bums Award" and
73
"choosing which instructions to follow should not be difficult.,
The Court made it clear that the USAW's refusal to comply with
the Bums Award became illegal once the Court ordered its
enforcement.

H. Sieracki's, USA W's, and USOC's Appeal
Following the issuance of the writ of mandamus, the USAW
finally submitted Lindland as its nominee to the USOC on August
25 th. 74 However, the USOC refused to accept the submission,
claiming it was untimely because Sieracki's entry had already been
75
submitted to the International Olympic Committee ("IOC").
Lindland once again returned to court where the Northern District
ordered the USOC to request the IOC to substitute Lindland for
Sieracki.76 The USOC complied with the judicial order and the
IOC accepted the tardy roster change because it came under
judicial order.77 Following his removal from the Olympic roster,
Sieracki attempted to persuade the District Court in Denver to
enforce the Campbell Award, but that court transferred the request
to the Northern District.78 Sieracki, the USAW, and the USOC
appealed together to the Seventh Circuit and a decision rejecting
72 See Id. (stating "Moreover, once the order has issued, USA Wrestling
must immediately perform its obligations, and if it does not do this the district
court must hold it in contempt of court and impose a sanction adequate to ensure
that our directions are implemented immediately and unconditionally.")
73 Id.
74 Lindland, 2000 WL 1269687, at *1.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at *1-*2.
78Id. at* 1.
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all of the appeals along with the request for enforcement of the
Campbell Award was made on September 1st.79 This decision
affirmed Lindland's place on the Olympic Team, and came exactly
prior to the opening of the Olympic Games in
two weeks
80
Sydney.

IV. ANALYSIS
In their appeal to the Appellate Court, the USAW, USOC, and
Sieracki made several claims. Although the Court did not find any
to be persuasive, the arguments raise intriguing questions about the
manner in which disgruntled athletes may utilize The Stevens Act.

A. Enforcement of the CampbellAward
The Appellants first argued that the Campbell Award was no
less valid than the Bums Award under the Federal Arbitration Act
and it should be enforced.81 The Court conceded that enforcement
of the Campbell award was not barred by Section 10 of the FAA,
which provides for the setting aside of any arbitration award that is
the result of corruption, fraud, or evident partiality.8" But the
Court also recognized that judicial enforcement of the Campbell
Award would have constituted annulment of the Bums Award, as
83
relief from the Bums Award was a part of the Campbell Award.
The Court was not willing to discard the result of the first
arbitration hearing.
In rejecting Appellants' argument, the Court focused on the
illegality of the second arbitration proceeding. The Seventh
Circuit ultimately ruled that the Campbell Award would be
unenforceable even if Lindland had not sought judicial
79 Lindland, 2000 WL 1269687, at *1.
80 Id.

81 Id. at *2 and 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
82 Lindland, 2000 WL 1269687, at *2.
83 Id.
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enforcement of the Bums Award.84 The Court found the second
hearing to be ultra vires because Arbitrator Campbell exceeded his
An individual may seek
powers in granting the award.85
arbitration under the Stevens Act only of certain determinations of
organizations such as the USAW.86 The basis of Sieracki's claim
to arbitration was not a decision of a NGB under the scope of the
Act, but rather the decision of Arbitrator Bums. 87 Furthermore,
Rule 48 of the American Arbitration Association, a rule that
governed both proceedings, prohibits the arbitration of any award
already decided. 88 The application of Rule 48 to this matter
clearly indicated the impropriety of the Denver hearing. The
second arbitration hearing covered the same issues as the first, and
it is unclear why Arbitrator Campbell did not recognize the
precluding effect of the first decision.

B. Legality of the Burns Award
Appellants further argued that the Bums Award was not worthy
of judicial enforcement. They claimed that the Chicago hearing
was fatally flawed because Sieracki was not a party to the
proceedings. 8 9 The Court rejected this argument based on the
language of the Stevens Act. The Court determined the Act
"provides for arbitration between an aggrieved athlete and the
90
national governing body, not for arbitration among athletes."
Because Lindland and the USAW attended the hearing, it fulfilled
the requirements of the Act.91 The Court further explained that
84 Id. at *3

85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Lindland,2000 WL 1269687, at *3.
88 Id. at *4.
89 Id. at *5.
90 Id.
91 Id. (stating "Arbitrator Campbell himself remarked that 'customarily in a
USOC Article IX arbitration.. .the competing athlete who does not initiate the
arbitration.. .is not a participant and not considered a necessary party by the

USOC.' If the USOC now favors a different approach, it should change its own
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although Sieracki had no right to participate 92in the hearing, his
interests were fully represented by the USAW.
The Court is correct in interpreting this issue, yet it raises
concerns regarding the operation of arbitration hearings under the
Stevens Act. The Court inferred in its opinion that the first
judicially enforced arbitration award will always be valid over a
conflicting award. 93 This may not have been problematic in this
situation where Sieracki's interests were equal to the USAW's. In
other situations however, the interests of parties directly affected
by arbitration awards may not be represented in the hearings where
they have a vested interest in the outcome. This aspect of the
Stevens Act is troubling considering Sieracki arguably had a far
greater interest in the outcome of the Bums hearing than did the
USAW.

C. PrivateRight of Action
The Appellants also argued that the Bums Award should be set
aside because the Stevens Act does not provide for a private right
of action. 94 The Appellants claimed that Lindland did not have the
statutory authority to seek judicial enforcement of the Bums
Award. 95 In rejecting this argument, the Court states that Lindland
Arbitration
sought to enforce the Bums Award under the Federal
action. 96
Act, a statute that contains a private right of
The plain language of the Federal Arbitration Act supports the
reasoning of the Court. "At any time within one year after the
award is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to the court
so specified for an order confirming the award. 97 In their appeal,
the Appellants relied on an interpretation of a 1984 Seventh
rules rather than ask a federal court to disregard an award that was reached
following normal procedures.")
92 Lindland, 2000 WL 1269687, at *5.
93 Id. at *2.
94 Id. at *5.
95 Id.
96 Id.

97 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
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Circuit decision that analyzed the predecessor of the current
Stevens Act. 98 Although this decision examined the right of action
contained in the Stevens Act, it did not involve the application of
the Federal Arbitration Act. It was the FAA that contained the
private right of action upon which Lindland relied in seeking
judicial enforcement of the Bums Award.

D. USOC "In Concert" With USAW
Moving beyond the Appellants' contentions, the Court states
that the most relevant issue is whether the USOC is bound by a
judicial determination originally leveled against the USAW.9 9 If
the USOC was not bound by the enforcement of the Bums Award
that was originally directed against the USAW, it could make its
own determination as to who should be nominated to the Olympic
Team. The USOC contended that as an organization entitled to
make independent decisions, it should not be bound by a ruling
originally entered against the USAW. 100 In examining this issue,
the Court looked to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d): "Every order granting an
injunction and every restraining order...is binding only upon the
parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees,
and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by
personal service or otherwise. ' 1° 1 Because the USAW and the
USOC are separate entities, the order of August 2 4 th would only
bind the USOC if the parties were in active concert with one
another.
The Court found the entities were in active concert based on
their joint action in contesting Lindland's claims and their joint
resistance to the Bums Award and the subsequent judicial
orders.' 0 2 Specifically, the Court points to the USOC's promise to

98 Michels v. United States Olympic Committee, F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984).
99 Lindland, 2000 WL 1269687, at *5.

100 Id. at *6.

101 Id. at *5.
102 Id. at *6.
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enforce the decision of the Campbell hearing and its implicit
promise to ignore the Bums award as evidence of its active
participation in the entire conflict. 10 3 Also, on August 2 4 th' the
USOC decided to accept the USAW's nomination of Sieracki to
the Olympic team, with full knowledge that such action was
contrary to the will of the Appellate Court. 10 4 The Court found
these actions to be strongly indicative of a joint effort between the
the Bums Award and the prior
USAW and the USOC to defeat
10 5
Circuit.
Seventh
the
of
decision
The Court stated that this presumption of active concert could be
defeated if the USOC proved it acted independently in deciding to
nominate Sieracki over Lindland to the IOC.1 0 6 However, because
the USOC did not have any independent grounds for choosing
Sieracki, this presumption could not be defeated.10 7 The USOC
had never chosen to send an individual to the Olympic Games
without regard to a NGB's nominee. 10 8 If the USOC regularly
made decisions based on the athletic prowess of individuals, or had
Sieracki, the Court stated it would have
a valid reason for selecting
10 9
decision.
respected that
This distinction made by the Court is critical to the outcome of
this controversy. Had the Court found that the USOC had an
independent ground for its decision, it may not have found an
obligation for the USOC to abide by a judgment originally directed
against the USAW. But it is readily apparent that the USOC had
no just motivations independent of the USAW's to exclude
Lindland from the Olympics. The USOC attempted to argue that
they independently found Lindland unfit to be its nominee because
of his persistence in fighting for his nomination to the Olympic
team.' ° The Court reiterates its rejection of this justification it

103 Id.
104 Lindland, 2000 WL 1269687, at *6.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Lindland, 2000 WL 1269687, at *6.
110 Id. at*7
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The Court found it
expressed in its opinion of August 24th.1
repugnant that an organization would purport as valid the
punishment of an individual
for seeking to enforce a legal right
12
1
law.
by
for
provided

E. 21-Day Exception
The Appellants also rely upon a section of the Stevens Act that
prohibits injunctive relief against the USOC 21 days before the
13
beginning of an international competition like the Olympics.1
The purpose of this section is to prevent judicial interference in the
corporation's internal conflict resolution process when there is
little time for that body to commence such proceedings. 1 14 The
decision issued by this court came fifteen days before the
beginning of the Sydney Games. 115 The Court rejected this
argument, stating that following the Appellants' reading of the
section, the USOC could avoid its legal obligations by refusing to
comply with judicial obligations until the statutory three-week
period. 116
The Court's interpretation of the relevant section prevents its use
as a loophole for the USOC in similar situations. It is quite
unlikely that Congress intended this clause to be used as an escape
valve from judicial orders.
Such an interpretation would
111Id.
112 Lindland, 2000 WL 1209451, at *3. (stating "Moreover, the suggestion
of the USOC (at page 17 of its memorandum in the court) that Lindland has
demonstrated unfitness for the team by initiating litigation, rather than accepting
the results of USA Wrestling's internal processes, demeans that august
organization. Congress gave athletes not only a right to arbitration but also a
right to judicial enforcement of ensuing awards. To propose that competitors
forfeit their rights as athletes when they use legal entitlements under the Ted
Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act and the Federal Arbitration Act is to
confess antipathy to one's legal obligations- a step that makes judicial
enforcement of the award all the more vital.")
113 Lindland,2000 WL 1269687, at *7, 36 U.S.C. § 220509(a) (Supp. 2000).
114 Id.
115 Lindland,2000 WL 1269687, at *7.
116 Id. at*8
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undermine the arbitration provision of the Stevens Act, as
enforcement of awards could be avoided by a USOC. In this
controversy, not only was there time for the internal conflict
resolution process to begin, it was completed well before the
statutory time limit. The conflict resolution process of the USOC
made his award on August
was completed when Arbitrator Burns
117
Act.
Stevens
the
in
9, as provided for

F. "Subsequent" LegislativeHistory
The final argument addressed by the decision is the unusual
attempt of the Appellants to submit "subsequent legislative
history."' 18 Senator Ted Stevens, the sponsor of the Act, wrote a
letter to the Appellate Court at the behest of the Appellants asking
the Court to vacate its order in favor of Lindland. 119 From its
reading of the letter, the Court suggested that the USOC
controversy. 120
misinformed the Senator on the nature of the
Notwithstanding that possibility, the Court stated that "legislative
history is a chancy subject; subsequent legislative history is
weaker still.' 12 1 In deciding Senator Stevens' letter should have
no probative value, the Court explained that such attempts by a
congressman to influence a judicial decision are a
of the functions of our branches of
misinterpretation
22
government.
The Court correctly recognized that Senator Stevens' opinion on
this matter should hold no weight. 123 It was unreasonable for the
Appellants to expect the Court to be influenced by a legislator,
even one who sponsored the statute in question. Had the Court
given weight to Senator Stevens' opinion, the precedent could
cause letters to flood the nation's courts from politicians
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Lindland, 2000 WL 1269687, at *8.
121 Id.
122 Id. at *9.
123 Id. at *8.
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influenced by parties involved in litigation. Even besides the
logistical problems that could follow, 124 the attempt is a reminder
of the importance (and necessity) of the distinct and intentional
separation of powers between our branches of government. If
every legislator's opinion was given evidentiary impact in our
courts, the ideal of judicial proceedings decided on its evidentiary
merits could become a myth. Fortunately, the Seventh Circuit
correctly decided that such a path should not be embarked upon.

G. Strategy
Matt Lindland succeeded in the litigation versus the USAW and
the USOC. The pivotal action in the controversy came when
Lindland sought judicial enforcement of the Bums Award just as
an opposite holding arose at the hearing in Denver. Although the
Appellate Court listed other factors in its decision, it cannot be
overlooked that the courts found the Bums Award dispositive
partly because it had been the first enforced in a federal court. By
seeking judicial enforcement of the Bums Award before Sieracki
had the opportunity to present the Campbell Award to a court,
Lindland effectively precluded any attempt by Sieracki to enforce
the award in his favor. Had Lindland not sought judicial
enforcement in a timely manner, the outcome of this controversy
may have been less clear to the courts.

V. IMPACT
Beyond the behavior of the USAW and the USOC and their
continual refusal to comply with judicial mandates, the Lindland
case demonstrated how potentially unfair proceedings may arise
from the Stevens Act. The most troubling result of the Lindland
proceedings is the Court's inference that similar controversies are
to be won by getting to the courthouse first. The FAA commands
the judicial enforcement of any fairly decided arbitration award.
124 Id.
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In this case, the Seventh Circuit in upholding the Bums Award,
relied significantly on the fact that it was the only one enforced by
a court. The Court also cited AAA rules that prohibit the
annulment by an arbitrator of a previous award. The arbitration
award enforcement process gives significant advantage to the
individual who first requests arbitration, especially considering the
Stevens Act and USOC regulations do not require an adverse
party's participation in the hearings. The Court also infers that
since the AAA does not allow arbitration over previous awards,
only one arbitration hearing is allowed under the Act. In this
unique situation, Sieracki's interests were vigorously represented
in the Bums hearing by the USAW. However, it is conceivable
that this may not always be the case, and an individual could suffer
from an arbitration ruling without representation in that proceeding
and without an opportunity to instigate arbitration of their own.
It may be difficult to improve the arbitration provision provided
in the Stevens Act. It is apparent that a possible flaw in its
execution is that it does not require the participation of all affected
parties in the matter. Sieracki had an important stake in the
outcome of the arbitration decisions, and his interests were well
represented by the USAW and the USOC because they shared his
position. However, would the process have been equitable if his
interests were not fully represented? Most likely, an amendment
to the Act could provide that all affected parties be involved in the
arbitration hearing, but that could bring problems of its own.
Namely, many parties could claim to be "affected" by an
arbitration decision, and any definition of such eligible parties
would be difficult to enumerate. But such a term was clearly
defined in this case, as Keith Sieracki was obviously a party
directly affected by the outcome of the arbitration. The lines may
not always be drawn so brightly. The arbitration method may
become unworkable if multiple parties are included. Because of
these conflicts, there may not be a clear manner in which to assure
the process will always be equitable.
A possible solution may be to provide some sort of appellate
process outside of -the judiciary to assure that an arbitration award
was granted according to the law and in fairness to all parties.
Such a procedure would allow an individual adversely affected by
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an award, such as Sieracki, to challenge the findings of an
arbitrator without necessarily attempting to seek arbitration of their
own. Such a procedure may have allowed Sieracki to present his
contentions without having to persuade an arbitrator to enter a
conflicting award.

VI. CONCLUSION
The ultimate decision was correct. The Seventh Circuit acted
properly in enforcing the Bums Award and compelling the USAW
These
and USOC to comply with the judicial mandates.
organizations were determined to abide by their own rulings and
judgments of this controversy, and had the Court not compelled
them into action, it only would encourage others to disregard
judicial decisions at will.
The Court correctly interpreted the legal issues of the
controversy, but the question of the ultimate fairness of the
outcome is more difficult to decipher. Although the Court
downplayed its importance,12 5 Lindland did win the race to the
courthouse. But winning this race may not have made the
outcome unfair. Even if Sieracki "won the race" it would have not
erased the deficiencies of the Campbell Award outlined by the
Seventh Circuit.12 6 The Court still would have been asked to
enforce a conflicting arbitration award that came second in time.
Lindland certainly gained the upper hand by seeking enforcement
first, yet that fact may not have proved determinative to the courts.
The Court maintained that the Campbell Award would have been
invalid even if brought to the courts first.12 7 The application of the
arbitration provision in the Stevens Act may well prove troubling
in the future. However, in this situation the enforcement of the

125 Lindland,2000 WL 1269687, at *4. (stating "Nor is it sensible to say, as
Sieracki does, that Lindland won a race to the courthouse. The Campbell
Award is invalid, so timing is immaterial.")
126 Namely, its violation of AAA Rule 48.
127 Lindland,2000 WL 1269687, at *4.
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award that provided for the rematch appeared to provide an
equitable solution.
What is lost in the myriad of litigation that surrounded the case
was that the original issue was whether the Olympic Trials referee
so botched the final bout that a rematch was in order.
Questionable officiating is an inseparable aspect of all sports,
especially in events like Greco-Roman wrestling where the rules
are complicated and the officials have a broad level of judgment.
The decisions made by the protest committees of the USAW and
by both of the arbitrators were, by their nature, quite subjective.
The protest committees had to review the officiating of the match
and make their own decisions on the fairness of the scoring and the
original outcome. The arbitrators in turn had to review the
procedures and decisions of the USAW protest committees. It is
impossible for this writer or any commentator to conclusively
decide whether those decisions were correct or erroneous. If
Arbitrator Bums was correct in determining the Trials match and
the review procedures were deficient, his decision to restage the
match was as fair a solution as could have been provided in such a
situation.
But ultimately, this litigation arose out of the protest procedures
of the USAW. As an organization that is, to a certain degree, a
product of federal law, its procedures are subject to scrutiny by the
courts. It may be confusing to many that the outcome of an
athletic event may end up in litigation, but truly this case was
ultimately about the execution of conflict resolution mandated by
federal law. The enforcement of the Bums Award was the most
equitable solution that could have been provided for in this
controversy.

VII. EPILOGUE
Despite the denial of the appeal by the Seventh Circuit, this
controversy was not completely put to rest until September 19 th,
five days after the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. One
day after the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions,
Sieracki asked the United States Supreme Court to stay the
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orders.12 8 Four days later, Supreme Court Justice John Paul
Stevens, without comment, refused Sieracki's request to issue the
stay. 129 Sieracki's final attempt to win a place in the Games came
on the 19 th, when he appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport,
a special panel that convenes during the Olympics to expedite
dispute resolutions that arise during the Games. 3 ° Lindland's
counsel immediately sought a hearing with a District Judge
seeking to an order compelling Sieracki to withdraw his motion
with the international court.' 3 ' The order was secured that at 1:45
that morning, fifteen minutes before the international court was set
to commence. 132 Since arbitration procedures over this matter
were codified in the Stevens Act, it is unlikely any court would
have approved a removal to an international tribunal.
The Olympic Greco-Roman Wrestling competition began on
September 2 4 th. Lindland won his first three matches, defeating
Georgian, Algerian, and Ukrainian opponents to reach the goldmedal match against Mourat Kardanov of Russia. 133 Lindland was
finally stopped in the final, shutout by a score of 3-0.'14 In
contrast to Matt Lindland's silver medal winning trip to Sydney,
Keith Sieracki provided this understandably dark reflection, "The
135
Olympic experience has been the worst experience of my life."'
Michael Steadman

128 Daniel C. Vock, "Adroit Moves, Sheer Persistence Lead To Olympic
Victory", Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Sept. 26, 2000.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Sun Sentinel Wire Services, "No Reprieve For Lindland In GrecoRoman Final",FT. LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 27, 2000.
134 Id.
135 Paul Parrish, "Supreme Court Stays Out of Fight," THE GAZETTE, Sept.

7, 2000.
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